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Abstract 
Though the main benchmark used to assess pension reforms continues to be the 
expected resulting fall in future government spending, the impact of policy changes on 
pension adequacy is increasingly coming to the fore.  As yet, there does not seem to 
be a broad consensus in policymaking circles and academic literature on what 
constitutes the best measure of pension adequacy.  While various indicators have been 
developed and utilised, no single measure appears to offer a clear indication of the 
extent to which reforms will impact on the achievement of pension system goals. 
Many indicators appear ill-suited to study the effective impact of reforms, particularly 
those that change the nature of the pension system from defined benefit to defined 
contribution.   
 
Existing measures are frequently hard to interpret as they do not have an underlying 
benchmark which allows their current or projected value to be assessed as adequate or 
inadequate. Currently used pension adequacy indicators tend to be point-in-time 
measures which ignore the impact of benefit indexation rules. They also are 
unaffected by very important factors, such as changes in the pension age and in life 
expectancy. This tends to make existing indicators minimise the impact of systemic 
reforms on the poverty alleviation and income replacement functions of pension 
systems. The emphasis on assumptions which are very unrepresentative of real-life 
labour market conditions also makes current indicators deceptive, particularly in 
relation to outcomes for women and those on low incomes.  
 
This paper posits that these defects can be remedied by using adequacy indicators 
based on estimates of pension wealth (i.e. the total projected flow of pension benefits 
through retirement) calculated using more realistic labour market assumptions. These 
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measures are used to give a better indication of the effective impact of pension 
reforms enacted since the 1990s in ten major European countries. They suggest that 
these reforms have decreased generosity significantly, but that the poverty alleviation 
function remains strong in those countries where minimum pensions were improved. 
However, moves to link benefits to contributions have raised clear adequacy concerns 
for women and for those on low incomes which policymakers should consider and 
tackle.  
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Introduction  
In recent decades European governments have embarked on significant pension 
reforms meant to ensure system sustainability.
1
 Since reducing the impact on 
future spending levels was frequently the main aim of these reforms, it is not 
surprising that many early studies focused just on this aspect.
2
 However, more 
recently, researchers have broadened their analysis beyond fiscal 
considerations
3
 and started to delve into the broader implications of these 
policy changes.
4
  
 
This change in research focus was, in part, inspired by a shift in thinking on 
pension reforms in international economic institutions. For instance in the 
1990s the World Bank was an all-out proponent of privatisation and 
retrenchment
5
, so much so that a policy review by its Independent Evaluation 
Group
6
 concluded that “Bank involvement in pension reform was often 
prompted by concerns about fiscal sustainability. Yet, in doing so, there often 
was a neglect of the primary goal of a pension system: to reduce poverty and 
provide retirement income within a fiscal constraint”.7 By contrast the Bank‟s 
present stance is that “pension systems need to provide adequate, affordable, 
sustainable, and robust benefits”.8  
 
However, while the standard measure of the fiscal success of a reform – 
reduced future spending
9
 – is well-known, understandable and clear, there is no 
                                              
1
  For an overview of these reforms, see European Commission (2010), OECD (2007) 
and Zaidi et al (2006). 
2
  See for instance, Disney (2000). 
3
  See, for example, Dekkers et al (2009) and Zaidi & Grech (2007). Grech (2012) 
contains an overview of many other such studies. 
4
  For instance, Forster & Mira D‟Ercole (2005) conclude that “changes in the 
generosity of public transfers and taxes have played the largest role in shaping 
changes in poverty risks among the elderly within individual countries” of the OECD 
during the second half of the 1990s.   
5
  World Bank (1994). 
6
  The Independent Evaluation Group is an independent unit within the World Bank that 
acts as an auditor of the impact of policies advocated by the Bank.   
7
  The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (2006). The World Bank‟s previous 
approach and its insistence on a mandatory fully funded second pillar had been 
criticised by a number of renowned economists, such as Kotlikoff (1999), Orszag & 
Stiglitz (1999) and Modigliani & Muralidhar (2005).    
8
  Holzmann & Hinz (2005). 
9
  A standard example of this approach is Schneider (2009). In it the author argues that 
“the larger the decrease in expected spending on public pensions in 2050 between two 
base years, the more successful a pension reform the country achieved”. 
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similar consensus on how best to measure whether pension entitlements will 
remain adequate. The scope of this paper is to review the indicators that have 
been proposed and used in the literature, and suggest alternative measures. To 
start this discussion, the following section outlines the aims of pension 
provision typically envisaged by policymakers. Section 2 describes the main 
pension adequacy indicators used in the literature, and their defects. An 
alternative set of indicators based on estimates of pension wealth for ten 
European countries is then proposed in section 3. Using pension wealth, rather 
than the standard pension adequacy indicators, helps address many of the 
concerns raised in section 2 – such as the limited ability of existing indicators 
to reflect the impact of different benefit indexation rules,
10
 changes in pension 
age and life expectancy and the impact of systemic reforms
11
 on generosity. 
While the empirical results have already been presented in Grech (2010), the 
paper sets out more clearly the methodological improvements of this approach 
by comparing them with currently used pension adequacy indicators.                 
 
1. Pension adequacy objectives envisaged by policymakers 
Pension policy differs largely across countries,
12
 but this has not stopped 
international institutions from coming up with adequacy objectives. While in 
no way prescriptive, these objectives are given their due consideration by 
national policymakers.   
 
The World Bank, for instance, has wielded considerable influence in shaping 
pension reforms. Its current stance is that “pension systems need to provide 
adequate, affordable, sustainable, and robust benefits”.13 By „adequate‟ the 
Bank intends that “all people regardless of their level or form of economic 
activity” have access to benefits “that are sufficient to prevent old-age poverty 
on a country-specific absolute level in addition to providing a reliable means to 
                                              
10
  Benefit indexation rules determine how the value of a benefit changes after it is 
awarded. For instance, a benefit could be increased in line with inflation over time. 
11
  In a systemic reform, a scheme‟s financing and benefit accrual structure is changed. 
In most cases, pension systems are changed from pay-as-you-go defined benefit 
(where benefits are determined in relation to an agreed pensionable income, financed 
out of current contributions) to defined contribution schemes (where benefits depend 
on contributions made, any accrued returns on these contributions and the time to be 
spent receiving the benefit), either notional (i.e. benefits are still financed from 
current revenues) or funded (i.e. contributions are not immediately spent). 
12
  Nevertheless, pension provision tends to be uniformly collectively organised. See 
Jousten (2007) for some theoretical explanations of why this happens across 
countries. Eckstein et al (1985) shows it is potentially welfare improving to have a 
compulsory pension scheme. 
13
  See Holzmann & Hinz (2005). 
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smooth lifetime consumption for the vast majority of the population”.14 The 
Bank specifies that “for a typical, full-career worker, an initial target of net-of-
tax income replacement from mandatory systems is likely to be about 40% of 
real earnings to maintain subsistence levels of income in retirement”.15 Systems 
offering rates above 60% are seen as unaffordable, as the Bank argues that they 
would require contribution rates which would be quite detrimental. Adequacy 
needs to be guaranteed over time such that “the pension program should be 
structured so that the financial situation does not require unannounced future 
cuts in benefits, or major and unforeseen transfers from the budget” and 
systems should be able to “sustain income-replacement targets in a predictable 
manner over the long term…in the face of unforeseen conditions and 
circumstances”.16  
         
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has through the years led 
representatives of governments, employers and trade unions to agree on a 
number of conventions on pension provision. These conventions aim to 
“guarantee protected persons who have reached a certain age the means of a 
decent standard of living for the rest of their life” – which is set by Convention 
238 as a replacement rate of 45%.
17
  This needs to be maintained in view of 
changes in the cost of living subsequent to retirement.  The ILO also argues 
that “statutory pension schemes must guarantee adequate benefit levels and 
ensure national solidarity”18 and that risks should not be borne solely by the 
individual but must be shared among all social agents.  Coverage must also 
extend to all members of society and there should not be gender inequality in 
provisions.
19
 
 
Since 2001, the European Union (EU) has achieved agreement among Member 
States on common objectives on pension policy – the achievement of which is 
monitored through the open method of co-ordination (OMC). The latter is a 
voluntary process for political cooperation, where progress towards these goals 
is measured by monitoring agreed common indicators. EU Member States 
prepare national reports, which are then assessed by the Commission and 
                                              
14
  Ibid. 
15
  Ibid. This is in line with International Labour Office (1952) – the basic convention for 
social security benefits.   
16
  Unfortunately, the same study, Holzmann & Hinz (2005) concludes that “most 
existing pension systems, including some of the recently reformed systems, are 
unable to deliver on these promises”. 
17
  See Humblet & Silva (2002). 
18
  See International Labour Office (2001).  
19
  Ibid. Gruat (1998) describes further the ILO‟s adequacy principles for pension 
reform.  
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Council and reflected in joint reports.
20
 In 2012 this culminated in the 
Commission preparing a white paper on pension reform.
21
 The pension 
adequacy objective agreed as part of the OMC states that countries should “in 
the spirit of solidarity and fairness between and within generations, guarantee 
adequate retirement incomes for all and access to pensions which allow people 
to maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living standard after retirement”.22 
The achievement of this objective is monitored by looking at 4 primary 
indicators, namely the at-risk-of-poverty rate of older people, their median 
relative income, the aggregate replacement ratio and the change in projected 
theoretical replacement ratio over the next 40 years.
23
 These indicators will be 
discussed in the next section. At the outset, it should be noted that the EU has 
shied away from adopting a minimum quantified pension adequacy indicators 
approach.   
 
2. Pension adequacy indicators 
Arriving at a precise definition of pension adequacy and operationalising it into 
an indicator has proven to be difficult. Besides the standard conception that 
pension adequacy is determined by the degree of poverty alleviation and 
consumption smoothing
24
 a system provides to the current pensioner 
generation, intergenerational comparisons of adequacy also play a role, 
particularly in the wake of substantial reforms.
25
 The perceived lack of 
effective pension adequacy indicators potentially could distort the pension 
reform debate. Some argue that it partly explains the continued predominance 
of fiscal considerations. For instance, Eckardt (2005) argues that “as long as no 
reliable prospective income indicators exist, which allow one to evaluate the 
effect of more structural changes on future benefits, the rather short-term 
policy-making process may further favour the principle of financial 
sustainability”.   
                                              
20
  See, for example, European Commission (2010). 
21
  European Commission (2012). 
22
  See European Commission (2005). 
23
  See European Commission (2009). Member States also monitor developments in 8 
secondary indicators and 1 context indicator. 
24
  See Barr and Diamond (2006) for a theoretical discussion of the purpose of pension 
systems, and Palacios & Sluchynsky (2006) and Caucatt et al (2007) for an outline of 
how national pension systems started being set up at the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
25
  Both Draxler & Mortensen (2009) and Abatemarco (2009) argue that adequacy has 
three different dimensions – intragenerational and intergenerational redistribution and 
lifetime  income smoothing, propose separate indices to measure these dimensions 
but then fail to apply their frameworks empirically.  
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2.1 Theoretical replacement rates 
Kolitkoff (1999) argues that pensions “should replace a reasonable fraction of 
pre-retirement income, i.e., they should be consistent with lifetime 
consumption smoothing”. In fact, most pension adequacy measures concentrate 
on how benefits compare with previous income. The most commonly used 
measure is the replacement rate. The latter tries to “assess how well older 
people can maintain their pre-retirement levels of consumption once they stop 
working”.26 The most economically accurate measure would be one comparing 
someone‟s consumption pre-retirement with that post-retirement. Due to data 
unavailability, this is approximated by comparing incomes collected on a 
longitudinal basis.  Goodin et al (1999), for instance, compute the „effective 
replacement rate‟ of public transfers in Germany, the Netherlands and the US 
by finding in national income surveys “those people whose principal source of 
income in one year was market income and whose principal source of income 
in the next year was public-transfer income” and then “calculate their income 
in the second (public-transfer-dependent) year as a proportion of their income 
in the first (market-dependent) year”.   
 
However, this direct measure of adequacy has its limitations. First of all, it is a 
historical measure – in that one needs to wait until retirement to be able to 
assess replacement rates. Secondly, it is an individual measure and thus may 
not be representative of the whole population. Thirdly, it is not a prospective 
measure and so does not give information on future changes in pension system 
rules – replacement rates would reflect rules as they related to that individual.  
Fourthly, it is data-intensive and such longitudinal data are not usually 
available. Fifthly it has no direct link with poverty as if someone is poor, and 
the pension system replaces 100% of income, while the replacement rate would 
seem generous, it would still not reduce the risk-of-poverty.
27
 Finally it is a 
single point-in-time indicator, and does not take longevity into account and 
how it affects transfers to the individual. 
 
To surmount some of these issues, theoretical replacement rates are frequently 
resorted to. The European Commission, as part of the OMC, regularly 
publishes estimates of “the level of pension income the first year after 
retirement as a percentage of individual earnings at the moment of take-up of 
pensions…for an assumed hypothetical worker, who in the so-called „base 
case‟ has a given earnings and career profile (male, earnings of average wage 
constant over his fulltime 40 years career, retiring at 65, etc)”.28 The latest 
estimates are shown in Table 1.  The OECD also publishes theoretical 
                                              
26
  Munnell & Soto (2005).        
27
  Goodin et al (1999), in fact, do not use the „effective replacement rate‟ as an 
adequacy indicator but as a measure of the extent to which welfare systems promote 
stability over an individual‟s life course.  
28
  European Commission (2010). 
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replacement rates for a range of hypothetical individuals, but restricts its results 
to state pension provision.
29
 Table 2 compares the OMC estimates with those 
made by the OECD for the hypothetical worker on average earnings, to give an 
idea of the role of private pensions. OECD estimates suggests that in ten 
countries state pensions do not offer the ILO recommended 45% replacement 
rate, while 6 countries offer what the World Bank deems unaffordable 
replacement rates. Note that the OECD prepares estimates for workers on 
different wage levels. This is similar to what is done in the United States, 
where the Social Security Trustees Report includes estimates for a number of 
stylised wage earners.
30
     
 
Blondell & Scarpetta (1999) was one of the first studies of cross-country 
theoretical replacement rates. However the authors were quick to point out that 
“there is no such thing as a single pension replacement rate in any national 
retirement scheme”. This because even with the simplest case – flat-rate 
universal old-age pensions – the gross replacement rate will still differ for 
individuals as it is determined by their previous earnings, while net 
replacement rates will be affected by the progressivity of the tax system. In 
fact, the estimates in Table 2 clearly show that replacement rates for people on 
different levels of wages differ greatly in most countries, while the data in 
Table 1 indicate that tax regimes also vary substantially. Table 2 also indicates 
that in some countries, the OMC replacement rate indicator is buoyed upwards 
substantially by private pensions. In some cases, such as Poland, Slovakia and 
the Netherlands, this is due to mandatory or quasi-mandatory private systems. 
Here the OMC replacement rates are subject to rate-of-return risk. In some 
other cases, there is also a considerable participation risk, as the OMC 
replacement rates assume that the average person voluntarily participates in a 
private pension scheme. For instance, in Ireland the replacement rate including 
private pensions is 47 percentage points higher than that from the mandatory 
state pension.    
 
  
                                              
29
  See OECD (2011). 
30
  See Social Security Administration (2012).  
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Table 1: Theoretical replacement rates (%) - OMC 
  
Gross replacement rate Net replacement rate 
At 65 At 75 At 65 At 75 
Austria  69 58 84 73 
Belgium 46 40 71 65 
Bulgaria  47 32 59 40 
Cyprus 47 44 53 48 
Czech Rep 59 50 78 67 
Denmark 58 53 81 74 
Estonia  32 30 40 38 
Finland 62 52 69 60 
France 64 54 78 65 
Germany 41 41 64 64 
Greece 105 86 115 99 
Hungary 65 64 105 106 
Ireland 76 70 84 79 
Italy 80 68 88 76 
Latvia 48 34 64 46 
Lithuania 49 47 66 61 
Luxembourg 64 57 79 68 
Malta 67 67 79 79 
Netherlands 92 92 104 104 
Poland 59 48 68 56 
Portugal  76 65 94 79 
Slovak Rep  58 53 75 71 
Slovenia 42 39 61 57 
Spain 88 82 95 89 
Sweden  68 65 71 68 
UK 61 54 73 66 
Note: Replacement rates are worked out on a gross and net (of income taxes and employee 
contributions, but always including employer contributions) basis. They represent the 
situation of people retiring under the legislation enacted by 2008, including any transitional 
rules to be implemented gradually that may be legislated in enacted reforms. They also 
include income from private pensions if coverage is significant. 
Source: European Commission (2010), and for Greece and Sweden, European Commission 
(2009). 
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Table 2: Theoretical gross replacement rates (%) – OECD 
  
At 0.5  times 
average wages 
At 1.5 times 
average wage 
 At average 
wage (OECD) 
 At average 
wage (OMC) 
Austria  77 72 77 69 
Belgium 60 33 42 46 
Czech Rep 80 37 50 59 
Denmark 65 17 29 58 
Estonia  38 21 26 32 
Finland 66 58 58 62 
France 56 41 49 64 
Germany 42 42 42 41 
Greece 96 96 96 105 
Hungary 44 44 44 65 
Ireland 58 19 29 76 
Italy 65 65 65 80 
Luxembourg 98 87 84 64 
Netherlands 59 20 29 92 
Poland 29 29 29 59 
Portugal  63 53 54 76 
Slovak Rep  26 26 26 58 
Slovenia 64 62 62 42 
Spain 81 81 81 88 
Sweden  46 23 31 68 
UK 54 23 32 61 
Source: European Commission (2010), and for Greece and Sweden, European Commission 
(2009), OECD (2011). 
 
Heterogeneity in replacement rates poses significant hurdles to use them as 
pension adequacy measures. To be able to do this, one would need to know to 
what extent the hypothetical individual, for whom the theoretical replacement 
ratio is estimated, is representative of the average pension recipient. On a 
theoretical level, Blondell & Scarpetta (1999) points out that the simplifying 
assumption of a flat earnings profile over the worker‟s lifetime and full 
indexation of earnings for benefit calculation may overstate the pension level. 
Workers tend to move across the wage distribution over their lifetime, starting 
with low wages and ending with higher wages closer to retirement. Moreover 
even if wages did not change with age, it is hardly likely that an individual 
would always receive the increase observed in average wages.      
 
Leaving aside these simplifying assumptions, the main criticism of theoretical 
replacement rates is the representativeness (or not) of the hypothetical worker. 
For instance, the EU‟s OMC indicator specifies a single male on average 
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earnings, employed full-time for 40 years uninterruptedly and retiring at 65. 
Leaving aside the obvious issue of gender, the first consideration is that across 
Europe the average person does not retire at 65. Eurostat data suggest that the 
average exit age from the labour force of males in 2010 stood at 61.5 for the 
EU-27. Employment rates are well below 100%, particularly for women, tend 
to fall over the working age and differ greatly by country.
31
  Close to a fifth of 
the workforce, most of them women, work part-time.
32
  Moreover by 
definition, an average wage, while being representative of the wage most 
commonly experienced in an economy, does not provide any indication of the 
extent of inequality in wage distribution. Eurostat‟s Structure of Earnings 
Survey (SES)
33
 reports that across the EU in 2010, the wage of those in the top 
tenth percentile of the wage distribution was more than 8 times that of those in 
the bottom tenth.
34
 The same data source also indicates earnings follow a 
pronounced age profile, accelerating rapidly at first before then decelerating 
after age 50.
35
   
 
The Commission is aware of these issues and its first report on theoretical 
replacement rates
36
 had noted that “the choice of specific common assumptions 
about the hypothetical worker used for the calculation, such as the age of 
retirement and length of working and contribution period before retirement, 
inevitably implies that only a share of all possible situations are taken into 
account”.37 European Commission (2009), for instance, notes that in Greece “a 
                                              
31
  The employment rate for men aged 25-64 stood at 75% in 2011 across the EU27, 
from a low of 67% in Bulgaria to a high of 83% in Sweden. For women the EU27 
average was 62%, ranging from 43% in Malta to77% in Sweden. The employment 
rate for those aged 55-64 was just 55% for men and 40% for women.   
32
  The respective figure for women was 32%. 
33
  The SES provides EU-wide harmonised structural data on gross earnings, hours paid 
and annual days of paid holiday leave which are collected every four years. 
34
  Wage inequality differs greatly across countries. For example, in Sweden those in the 
bottom tenth percentile get a wage only a quarter less than the median wage; whereas 
in the neighbouring Baltic country of Estonia the ratio is more like half. 
35
  On average across the EU, in 2010, the mean wage of men aged under 30 was just 
three-fifths the mean wage of men aged 40 to 49. By contrast those aged over 60 have 
a wage only 3% higher than those aged 40-49.    
36
  European Commission (2006). 
37
  A further complication is the economic assumptions taken, as these can be a very 
important determinant of replacement rates for defined contribution systems. For 
instance European Commission (2006) had set the long run rate of return on 
investments at 2.5%. By contrast the real wage growth assumption for some 
countries, such as Poland, was set higher. Partly as a result of these awkward 
assumptions, that imply dynamic inefficiency, the replacement rate of Poland‟s 
defined contribution pension systems was shown to decline substantially over time.  
In their contribution to European Commission (2006), Polish national experts had 
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negligible portion of pensioners, below 3%, complete 40 contribution years 
before retirement”. Since average career length in Greece is 25 years, while the 
OMC indicator suggests that pensions in Greece are the most generous in the 
EU, the poverty rate among Greek pensioners is the fifth highest, as people do 
not get that implied generous pension. Only in 9 EU countries, men contribute 
40 years or more prior to retirement.
38
 Given these issues, it is not surprising to 
find that there is only very weak correlation between the net theoretical 
replacement rate and the difference between the risk of poverty of men aged 
over 65 and that of men of working age (see Figure 1). The degree of 
correlation is even weaker when one considers gross theoretical replacement 
rates. 
 
Figure 1: Cross plot of net replacement rate against the difference in the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate (2008) 
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Note: The difference in the at-risk-of-poverty rate measures the (percentage point) difference 
between the risk of poverty faced by the 65+ and that faced by the 15-64 in each EU country. 
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC data and European Commission (2010). 
 
These problems with theoretical replacement rates are not specific to the OMC.  
Mitchell & Phillips (2006) assess how replacement rates computed by the US 
Social Security Administration (SSA) differ for actual and hypothetical earner 
profiles, using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). They show 
that, on average, actual HRS workers have substantially lower earnings paths 
than the medium SSA hypothetical profile, and incorporating this would make 
the US system 15% more generous to the average worker than reported by the 
                                                                                                                                 
pointed out that using a scenario based on historical data on rates of return and wage 
growth would result in a diametrically opposite result. 
38
  On average, across the EU, average career length appears to be around 38 years for 
men and slightly less than 30 years for women. 
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SSA.  Rettenmaier & Saving (2006) also question the Social Security Trustees 
Report‟s practice of computing replacement rates by “converting workers‟ past 
earnings into today‟s dollars using the rise in average wages over time” and 
instead argue that price indexing would be a more accurate measure of pre-
retirement resources available for consumption.  
 
2.2 Moving beyond theoretical replacement rate measures 
One could summarise the previous section by saying that theoretical 
replacement rates suffer from two problems; their being limited to a 
hypothetical case that might not be representative of the general population, 
and their being abstract measures of system generosity that may not play that 
much a role in determining the actual living standards of individuals.  In fact, 
researchers that have sought to move beyond theoretical replacement rates have 
come up with two approaches; (i) look at results for various types of 
hypothetical cases to better approximate the actual population, and (ii) utilise 
other measures based on government spending and/or income survey data.    
 
2.2.1 Increasing the number of hypothetical cases 
Table 2 shows OECD replacement rate estimates for workers on different 
levels of wages.  This makes a lot of difference for pension systems that do not 
have a linear earnings-related profile, particularly countries with flat-rate 
pensions. For instance while the replacement rate for those on half the average 
wage in the UK is more than double that for those earning one and a half times 
the average wage, in Germany and Italy replacement rates are the same across 
the wage distribution.  
 
To investigate the impact of its assumptions, the European Commission 
requests countries to also present variants of theoretical replacement rates that 
depart from these assumptions; such as a case where the individual‟s wage 
grows linearly over the career from the average wage to twice the latter, a 
broken career variant where there are no contributions or credits for 10 years, 
cases where the career break is of 3 years either because of unemployment or 
childcare, and variants with earlier and later retirement. Unsurprisingly, as can 
be seen in Table 3, these cases confirm that replacement rates vary 
substantially. Rising wage profiles tend to result in lower rates, either as 
entitlements are based on career-average income rather than the final salary 
(e.g. Italy) and/or because there are maximum pensionable incomes (e.g. UK).  
Later retirement tends to yield very generous benefits (e.g. in Hungary the 
replacement rate is 17 percentage points higher), whereas early retirement is 
not as penalised (e.g. in Hungary the penalty of retiring early is 13 percentage 
points). In some counties, for example Slovakia, taking time off to take care of 
children results in a significant drop in replacement rates whereas in others, 
such as Sweden, there is no such fall.  
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Table 3: Different OMC theoretical net replacement rates (%) 
 Base 
case 
3 years 
unemployed 
3 years 
childcare 
break 
10 years 
career 
break 
Retire 
at 63 
Retire 
at 67 
Wage 
rising to 
2xaverage 
Austria 84 83 82 70 77 88 76 
Belgium 71 70 71 64 70 72 50 
Bulgaria 59 48 46 40 51 67 59 
Cyprus 53 49 49 41 53 53 45 
Czech Rep 78 59 55 56 66 90 48 
Denmark 74 74 74 74 73 78 46 
Estonia 40 38 38 34 35 49 49 
Finland 69 66 65 54 62 76 65 
France 78 73 75 58 62 89 55 
Germany 64 62 65 48 57 74 46 
Greece 120 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Hungary 105 102 105 92 92 122 89 
Ireland 84 78 81 74 81 86 62 
Italy 88 84 76 68 84 93 72 
Latvia 64 52 53 48 56 73 57 
Lithuania 66 50 50 51 54 79 45 
Luxembourg 96 93 96 80 92 97 73 
Malta 79 79 79 79 79 79 46 
Netherlands 104 102 100 91 93 112 78 
Poland 68 66 61 57 66 70 58 
Portugal 94 94 88 70 78 109 90 
Slovak Rep 75 54 53 57 64 87 56 
Slovenia 61 60 61 50 56 70 49 
Spain 95 93 95 87 84 100 81 
Sweden 65 60 65 NA 62 76 71 
UK 73 71 74 58 71 77 52 
Note: Replacement rates are worked out on a net of income taxes and employee contributions 
basis, but include employer contributions. They represent the situation of people retiring 
under the legislation enacted by 2008, including any transitional rules to be implemented 
gradually that may be legislated in enacted reforms. They also include income from private 
pensions if coverage is significant. 
Source: European Commission (2010). 
 
The problem with having a number of stylised individuals rather than just a 
base case is that the stylised individuals are set up to reflect just one deviation 
from the base case – e.g. an earlier retirement age. Bridgen & Meyer (2008), by 
contrast, tries to inject more realism by creating hypothetical cases with 
different features (i.e. more of a scenario analysis approach than a simulation) 
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and seeing how they would be treated by six different public-private pension 
systems. The cases are a mother and unqualified part-time worker in the retail 
sector, a mother and qualified part-time worker in the welfare sector, a married 
carer working in the informal sector, a small business entrepreneur, an 
unqualified male worker in the car industry and a middle manager in financial 
services. The results differ greatly across countries, with the female workers 
and the business entrepreneur tending to fall below the poverty threshold, while 
male workers getting very high replacement, particularly in countries with 
strong defined benefit pension systems.    
 
Still, trying to understand the overall impact of a system by having more 
hypothetical individuals raises the problem of how to weight the different cases 
to have a synthetic indicator of adequacy. Similarly, one needs to consider how 
the importance of a particular type of hypothetical case should be treated over 
time.  
 
2.2.2 Spending and/or income based measures of adequacy 
A rather wider measure, which departs from the concept of theoretical 
replacement rates, involves comparing the disposable income of retired persons 
to that of other groups. Forster & Mira D‟Ercole (2005), using data collected 
from an OECD questionnaire on household incomes, compute „quasi-
replacement rates‟, defined as “the mean disposable income of persons aged 66 
to 75, relative to the mean disposable income of persons aged 51 to 65”.39 Two 
conceptually similar measures are primary pension adequacy indicators 
monitored as part of the EU‟s OMC. The median relative income ratio 
compares the median income of persons aged over 65 to that of those aged 
below 65. The other OMC indicator, i.e. the aggregate replacement ratio, 
compares the median individual pension income of retirees aged 65-74 in 
relation to median earnings of employed persons aged 50-59 excluding social 
benefits other than pensions.  These measures differ from the longitudinal 
replacement rates described in section 2.1, and may suffer from cohort effects 
particularly in countries which in recent decades passed through rapid periods 
of economic growth and/or changes in participation rates, such as Eastern 
European countries. 
  
                                              
39
  When calculating changes over time, they keep population shares constant, as an 
increase in the elderly (who tend to have lower incomes) depresses total income and 
this creates a bias in that ageing brings an improvement in the relative income 
position of the elderly. 
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Figure 2: Cross plot of median relative income ratio against the difference 
in the at-risk-of-poverty rate (2008) 
y = -51.717x + 44.463
R² = 0.4386
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Note: The difference in the at-risk-of-poverty rate measures the (percentage point) difference 
between the risk of poverty faced by the 65+ and that faced by the 15-64 in each EU country. 
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC data and European Commission (2010). 
 
Figure 3: Cross plot of aggregate replacement ratio against the difference 
in the at-risk-of-poverty rate (2008) 
y = -48.339x + 24.75
R² = 0.2681
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Note: The difference in the at-risk-of-poverty rate measures the (percentage point) difference 
between the risk of poverty faced by the 65+ and that faced by the 15-64 in each EU country. 
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC data and European Commission (2010). 
 
That said, these two indicators appear to be more strongly correlated with the 
difference between the risk-of-poverty rate observed for those aged over 65 and 
that of those of working age. As could be expected, the median relative income 
ratio appears to be more closely related to the difference in the incidence of 
poverty, as it includes all income streams of those aged over 65 rather than just 
focus on pensions. However, even the aggregate replacement ratio – which 
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conceptually should be the closest to the theoretical replacement rates – 
displays a significantly closer relationship. There appears to be very little 
correlation between the aggregate replacement ratio and the theoretical 
replacement ratios estimated for many EU27 countries. For instance, while the 
gross theoretical replacement ratio for Greece is estimated at 105%, the 
aggregate replacement ratio for men is just 49%. Only in a few countries, 
notably France and Germany, the aggregate replacement ratio appears to be 
higher than the theoretical estimate. The aggregate replacement ratio across the 
EU27 stood at 55% for men and 52% for women in 2011, above the ILO-
recommended 45% replacement rate and in only 4 countries it is clearly above 
60%.  
 
Another indicator developed by the EU Commission, but not used in the OMC, 
is the benefit ratio. The latter is defined as “the average benefit of public 
pensions as a share of the economy-wide average wage”.40 This measure, 
derived from projections of pension spending and pension beneficiaries 
submitted to the Commission by Member States,  the average public pension 
(found by dividing spending by the number of beneficiaries) to the output per 
worker in that economy. A related indicator is the gross average replacement 
rate, which is “the average first pension as a share of the economy-wide 
average wage at retirement”.41 These indicators differ substantially from the 
theoretical replacement rates, as can be seen in Table 4, and there is very little 
correlation when comparing results for different countries. Benefit ratios and 
gross average replacement rates tend to imply much less generous pension 
systems, with the average across the EU being very close to the ILO-
recommended 45% replacement rate. Part of the gap between these measures 
undoubtedly reflects the inclusion of private pensions in the theoretical 
replacement rates estimates,
42
 but it is more likely that the unrealistic labour 
market assumptions underpinning the theoretical replacement rates play more 
of a role in explaining differences.   
 
 
  
                                              
40
  European Commission (2012).  
41
  Ibid. 
42
  For instance, European Commission (2012) includes the benefit ratio for Denmark 
including private pensions, which at 59% is much closer to the theoretical 
replacement rate for this country. 
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Table 4: Different pension adequacy indicators compiled by the EU 
Commission (%) 
 Gross 
theoretical 
replacement 
rate 
Median 
relative 
income 
Aggregate 
replacement 
ratio 
Benefit 
ratio 
Gross 
average 
replacement 
rate 
Austria 69 92 56 42 48 
Belgium 46 96 68 39 45 
Bulgaria 47 77 46 46 50 
Cyprus 47 80 51 43 45 
Czech Rep 59 67 40 26 29 
Denmark 58 83 52 36 33 
Estonia 32 74 42 39 36 
Finland 62 79 47 49 52 
France 64 84 51 40 59 
Germany 41 106 71 47 41 
Greece 105 90 49 36 59 
Hungary 65 88 48 31 38 
Ireland 76 106 61 27 37 
Italy 80 86 46 49 80 
Latvia 48 94 58 24 48 
Lithuania 49 82 45 39 38 
Luxembourg 64 101 62 59 78 
Malta 67 106 65 51 59 
Netherlands 92 81 45 44 NA 
Poland 59 89 53 47 49 
Portugal 76 103 64 46 57 
Slovak Rep 58 88 57 39 42 
Slovenia 42 107 68 44 51 
Spain 88 86 59 19 NA 
Sweden 68 96 51 55 72 
UK 61 84 61 35 35 
Note: Theoretical replacement rates represent the pension entitlements of those retiring in 
2008 and include income from private pensions if coverage is significant. Median relative 
income includes all incomes of those aged over 65, while the aggregate replacement ratio 
includes only pension income. The benefit ratio and the gross average replacement rate only 
include state pension income. The income to which these flows are compared varies from 
average wages (benefit ratio and, to a lesser extent, aggregate replacement ratio) to average 
income of the under-65s (for the median relative income ratio) to wage before retirement 
(gross theoretical replacement rate and gross average replacement rate). 
Source: European Commission (2010), Own analysis of EU-SILC data & European 
Commission (2012). 
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Moreover the choice of the denominator of the adequacy measure is also very 
important. In the case of the theoretical replacement rate, pension income is 
compared to the individual‟s previous income. However, while having a very 
high replacement rate on a very low level of previous income ensures a good 
degree of consumption smoothing; it would do little to help alleviate the risk-
of-poverty. By comparing pension outcomes to the average wage or income, 
the benefit ratio and the median relative income ratio provide a better 
benchmark. The OECD, in recognition of this fact, also estimates relative 
pension levels for its theoretical full-career workers, where pension 
entitlements are compared to the average economy-wide wage. To also take 
into account the fact that pension generosity might not be linear in relation to 
one‟s pre-retirement wage, the OECD then weights these relative pension 
levels for individuals across the wage distribution to arrive at an indicator for 
the whole distribution. These estimates, presented in Table 5, suggest that 
pension generosity can be significantly less pronounced when taking the 
average wage as the numeraire. The gap between the most generous pension 
system, Greece, and the least generous, the UK, is cut by a fifth. Only in very 
progressive pension systems operating in very equal societies, e.g. Sweden, the 
weighted average gross relative pension levels surpass the gross theoretical 
replacement rate for those on average incomes.      
 
A change in denominator is also suggested in Borella & Fornero (2009), which 
proposes the use of a “comprehensive replacement (CORE) rate”, defined as 
“the ratio between net disposable income when retired and net disposable 
income when active”. Income includes wages, self-employment and private 
income, as well as cash benefits from the state. On the other hand, Hurd & 
Rohwedder (2008) propose what they call “the wealth replacement rate”. This 
involves simulating consumption paths over the remaining life for a household 
sample observed after retirement, and then assessing whether the resources 
available to each household could support this consumption path. This 
approach not only relies on longitudinal data (very difficult to have on a 
consistent cross-national basis) but is also very data intensive. There have been 
some attempts to make this sort of adequacy assessment by means of dynamic 
microsimulation models.
43
  
 
  
                                              
43
  Dynamic microsimulation involves a year-to-year estimation of income for each 
person in a survey based on their projected personal characteristics and tax/benefit 
systems. See Employee Benefit Research Institute (2006), Emmerson et al (2004) and 
Frommert & Heien (2006) for a US, UK and German example, respectively. This 
approach is starting to feature in cross-country research with the prime example being 
EUROMOD, a model meant to cover all of the EU (see Avram & Sutherland (2012)).  
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Table 5: Different pension adequacy indicators compiled by the OECD(%) 
 
Weighted average 
gross relative 
pension level 
Gross 
replacement rate 
(average wage) 
Austria 68 77 
Belgium 38 42 
Czech Rep 48 50 
Denmark 80 80 
Estonia 47 48 
Finland 60 58 
France 44 49 
Germany 39 42 
Greece 82 96 
Hungary 71 76 
Ireland 29 29 
Italy 65 65 
Luxembourg 83 87 
Netherlands 87 88 
Poland 56 59 
Portugal 52 54 
Slovak Rep 56 58 
Slovenia 57 62 
Spain 73 81 
Sweden 64 54 
UK 30 32 
Note: Gross replacement rates and gross relative pension levels are both compiled on the 
basis of male full-career hypothetical cases. However the gross relative pension levels have 
the economy-wide average wages as the denominator, rather than the individual‟s own wage. 
The gross relative pension levels are estimated for individuals across the wage distribution.  
Source: OECD (2011). 
 
3. An alternative approach to measure pension adequacy 
To summarise the previous discussion, there appear to be two lines of thought 
in terms of the numeraire to be used to define pension adequacy; namely 
someone‟s previous earnings and average contemporary income.  Both 
concepts seem valid – the first reflects consumption smoothing and the latter 
poverty alleviation. The other major undecided point is whether a measure 
should capture the theoretical generosity of a system or else actual generosity.  
Some would argue that a measure of generosity needs to keep the metric 
constant and look at how a system performs for a standard person under 
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unchanged conditions. This is partly justified in that actual economic behaviour 
will be affected by generosity (so workers in Greece have shorter careers 
because their system provides incentives for them to do so). However it is 
debatable whether such a theoretical measure is useful to study the poverty 
alleviation function of pensions.   
 
Interestingly the literature review reveals that there has been little discussion of 
one particularly major issue with replacement rates – namely their limitation to 
being single point-in-time indicators.  Isolating pension generosity at a single 
point-in-time fails to take into account differences in longevity and state 
pension ages between generations and also ignores how pension payments 
change over the period in retirement. As OECD (2005) points out, these 
constitute very significant factors, particularly when comparing pension policy 
on a cross-country basis.  A country with low life expectancy could „afford‟ to 
pay higher replacement rates to its citizens while imposing the same financial 
burden on workers as a country with higher life expectancy but with lower 
replacement rates.  Similarly a country where pensions lose their relative value 
significantly over time, can afford to pay a higher replacement rate at 
retirement than a country where the relative value of pension benefits remains 
constant throughout retirement.
44
  
 
These issues matter. Increasing longevity is one of the reasons why pensions 
have become so topical for governments. Changing the eligibility age has been 
the most frequent parametric pension reform carried out since the 1990s.
45
 At 
first the main change was the equalisation of pension ages between men and 
women (e.g. Austria, Slovakia), but increasingly countries (e.g. Germany, UK) 
are raising the age for both genders. At the same time, some countries (e.g. 
Italy, Sweden) have introduced defined contribution systems, which penalise 
retiring at the same age if life expectancy rises. Under these systems the same 
amount of contributions translates into less annual pension if the period which 
is meant to be covered increases.  Another frequent reform has been the shift 
from uprating pensions in line with changes in average earnings. For instance, 
Austria and Germany at first moved towards linking pensions to net earnings, 
so that the burden of higher social security contributions would be more fairly 
shared between workers and pensioners.  More recently, Austria adopted price 
uprating while Germany introduced the „sustainability factor‟ to adjust pension 
benefits to changes in the dependency ratio.  Very few countries now have in 
place pension systems where generosity stays constant in relative earnings 
terms.          
 
                                              
44
  Indexation, of course, can reduce the generosity of all types of social benefits. See 
Sutherland et al (2009) for a review of how indexation has affected the British 
welfare system over time.    
45
  See Zaidi et al (2006) and OECD (2011).  
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The impact of indexation on generosity can be quite substantial. Table 1 
includes OMC estimates of gross and net theoretical replacement rates for 
someone at retirement (at age 65) and ten years after (at age 75). On average, 
across the EU there is a drop of 11% and 10% in gross and net replacement 
rates, respectively. In some countries, the declines are much more pronounced 
(e.g. nearly a third in Latvia, a fifth in Poland and Greece). Given that life 
expectancy in 2010 for men and women was close to 20 years, the ten-year 
period constitutes just the half-life of a pension stream. If the relative value loss 
proceeds in a linear fashion, by the last year of life pensions would be a fifth 
less in earnings terms than at the beginning. This impact would be even more 
pronounced if earnings growth accelerates over time, for example as a result of 
economic convergence between EU countries. 
 
The best way to address such concerns is by resorting to estimates of pension 
wealth.
46
 Brugiavini et al (2005), while noting that “there is no simple and 
unique definition of pension wealth” argues that “for an individual, pension 
wealth is, broadly speaking, the present discounted value of future pension 
rights, taking into account of mortality prospects.” In mathematical notation, 
this can be expressed as: 
 
    ∑  
            
 
     ………. (1) 
 
where     is pension wealth at age of retirement (h), S is the age of certain 
death, β is the pure time discount factor, a is the age of the individual,    is the 
conditional survival probability at age (s) for an individual alive at age (a) and 
      is the pension expected at age (s).     
 
Equation (1) brings out the advantages of pension wealth estimates over 
replacement rates. Firstly, this is a measure that expressly takes into account 
the period for which benefits will be received.  Increased longevity increases 
pension wealth, but it does not impact replacement rates. Similarly an increase 
in pension age decreases pension wealth, while it does not show up in changes 
in replacement rates. The inclusion of a discount factor helps address the well-
known economic fact that income streams in the future are less attractive than 
earlier ones. Secondly, pension wealth measures the entire income stream, 
rather than focusing on just one payment in time. Thus if pension benefits fall 
in relative value over time, pension wealth would be less than if they stay 
constant. A replacement rate tells you nothing about how it will evolve.
47
 A 
reform changing indexation would not change the replacement rate at 
retirement, but it would clearly show up when looking at pension wealth.   
                                              
46
  The concept of pension wealth was first used in applied economics in Feldstein 
(1974). 
47
  One way of conceiving pension wealth is as a replacement rate multiplied by an 
annuity factor, meant to capture the number of years for which the benefit will be 
received and the change in the replacement rate over time. 
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OECD (2011) suggests that pension wealth “can be thought of as the lump sum 
needed to buy an annuity giving the same flow of pension payments as that 
promised by mandatory retirement-income schemes”. Take, for instance, a case 
where the pension benefit is equivalent to 50% of average earnings throughout 
a retirement period of 20 years. Assuming away time preference over when to 
receive the money, you would be as better off if you forgo receiving pensions 
in lieu of a payment equivalent to ten times average earnings. If however 
benefits are expected to fall in relative terms by a tenth every ten years (broadly 
in line with the EU average decline in replacement rates over time), you would 
require just a payment of nine times.       
 
There are two ways in which pension wealth is typically calculated – the 
empirical and the institutional approaches. The empirical method involves 
using data from income and wealth surveys. As a result it tends to be 
retrospective in that it reflects current entitlements and past pension system 
rules.
48
 By contrast, the institutional approach tries to calculate prospective 
pension entitlements by applying “the pension system‟s parameters – such as 
accrual rates, minimum pensions, indexation rules, eligibility requirements etc. 
– to calculate pension benefits”49 for a number of stylised individuals and then 
grosses up results. In this section we present pension wealth estimates 
computed using this approach for ten EU countries which have undergone 
considerable pension reforms.
50
 These countries, namely Austria, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK, not 
only cover 70% of the EU‟s population, but also have very different pension 
systems and enacted very different reforms.
51
 These pension wealth estimates 
were computed using the OECD‟s APEX cross-country pension entitlement 
model
52
 and cover only state pensions (including minimum pensions
53
). Our 
                                              
48
  For a thorough discussion of this approach and how it is being integrated in national 
accounts see ECB (2009). There are variants of this approach which try to incorporate 
future entitlements by trying to project the impact of future rules.  
49
  See Whitehouse (2003). 
50
  Note that these estimates are based on the pension system rules as at 2010. The 
deterioration of the sovereign debt crisis led to some subsequent reforms, particularly 
in Hungary and Italy, where generosity was cut substantially (see European 
Commission (2012) for details). However for the other countries these estimates 
remain valid. 
51
  For a brief description of these reforms, see Grech (2010). 
52
  The APEX (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across countries) model was originally 
developed by Axia Economics, with funding from the OECD and the World Bank. 
The model codes in detail the parameters of a country‟s pension system (which are 
vetted by social security officials from that country). It is used by the OECD‟s 
biennial „Pensions at a Glance‟ publication, the World Bank‟s „Pensions Panorama‟ 
and forms the basis of one of the OMC indicators (the prospective change in net 
theoretical replacement rates).    
53
  To simplify matters, we assume no income other than state pensions.  
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estimates compare the pre-reform (i.e. the pension system rules for pensioners 
retiring now) with the post-reform (i.e. the rules under which people will retire 
in 2050) pension systems.  
 
The OECD publishes estimates of pension wealth, but these are for the 
standard full-career case. By contrast, our results try to approximate reality 
better by adopting an alternative measure of career length based on Labour 
Force Survey data on labour market participation by age and gender.
54
 In all ten 
countries, elderly women are much more at-risk-of-poverty than elderly men. 
Yet, by assuming full careers for women, OECD estimates of pension wealth 
for women are higher than those for men, as women have longer life 
expectancy. Also, rather than focus on the median case, our focus is on 
individuals in the bottom half of the wage distribution who tend to be more 
dependent on state pensions and less reliant on other forms of retirement 
income provision. Table 6 compares these estimates of pension wealth with 
those for someone with a full-career and on average wages.  
 
Across the ten countries, adjusting for actual-careers and the level of wages 
lowers net pension wealth. The reduction is, as expected, largest for women, 
who get only 80% of the full-career average wage entitlement. However the 
reduction for men is also strong, at 85%, particularly in countries with 
relatively low employment rates (e.g. Slovakia). While the full-career estimates 
suggest women get the equivalent of one year‟s average wage more than men, 
adjusting for actual labour participation and lower wage levels reveals that they 
get roughly the same amount as men. Links between the level of contributions 
and that of benefits offset most of the impact of having a higher life 
expectancy. More simply, women have to make nearly the same pension 
entitlements last for more than men. Keep in mind that, even ignoring lesser 
entitlements due to lower wages and more broken careers, pension wealth 
estimates suggest that women are worse off than men – something that 
replacement rates do not show. In fact, the net replacement rates published by 
the OECD, and used in the EU‟s OMC, are the same for both genders. If 
pensions maintained their relative value over time, one would expect the 
difference in longevity between men and women to be reflected in an 
equivalent difference in net pension wealth. By contrast, across these ten 
countries while post-retirement longevity is 17.5 years for men and 23.3 years 
for women (i.e. a third higher for women), even with the same wage and labour 
participation, net pension wealth of women is just 15% higher. The worst 
affected are those in countries with long retirement periods where pensions are 
indexed to prices. For instance, in Poland while the post-retirement longevity 
                                              
54
  More details on the assumptions taken can be found in Grech (2012).Note that similar 
to the OECD, we ignore the impact of household formation and model entitlements 
for single individuals. This may weaken the validity of some of our results for 
countries where pension entitlements depend also on the income of the individual‟s 
partner.   
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differential between genders is 60%, that in pension wealth is just 6%. 
Unsurprisingly the risk-of-poverty among elderly women is 6.9 percentage 
points (70%) higher than that for men. In Germany, where there is not such a 
differential, the gap in poverty rates is half as large.       
 
Table 6: Net pension wealth estimates for current pension systems 
(multiple of average wage) 
 Male full-
career on 
average wage 
Male actual-
career in 
bottom half of 
wage 
distribution 
Female full-
career on 
average wage 
Female 
actual-career 
in bottom half 
of wage 
distribution 
Austria 7.8 8.1 8.6 8.2 
Finland 7.5 5.3 8.9 5.8 
France 8.3 6.8 9.4 5.5 
Germany 6.1 5.2 7.4 4.8 
Hungary 9.2 6.2 11.4 8.5 
Italy 8.8 8.4 9.6 8.4 
Poland 7.0 4.6 7.4 6.2 
Slovak Rep 9.2 8.3 11.3 8.7 
Sweden 6.6 6.2 7.5 6.1 
UK 4.4 3.8 5.1 4.5 
Average* 7.0 5.9 8.0 6.0 
Note: Net pension wealth for actual-career case based on labour market participation by age 
and sex data. See Grech (2012) for details. The actual-career case reflects the pension 
entitlements for those earning a wage up to the 50
th
 percentile of the wage distribution.   
* Weighted average by population. 
Source: OECD (2011) and own estimates using same model used in OECD (2011). 
 
To link better the adequacy indicator to the risk-of-poverty among pensioners, 
pension wealth estimates need to be compared with a quantitative benchmark.
55
 
For this purpose we compute that measure of total pension flows which would 
enable an annual income equal to the poverty threshold throughout retirement. 
If net pension wealth is higher than this „net pension requirement‟, on average, 
the pension system would be preventing poverty during retirement.
56
 Net 
                                              
55
  In this paper we focus on the poverty alleviation dimension of pension adequacy. 
Pension wealth can, however, be used to look at the income replacement dimension 
(one would need to redefine pension wealth from multiples of the economy-wide 
average wage to multiples of the individual‟s pre-retirement wage) and the 
intergenerational dimension (by comparing pension wealth entitlements of successive 
cohorts). Grech (2010) provides indicators for all three dimensions. 
56
  Note however that since transfers are not constant for all years, even when net 
pension wealth is equal to the „net pension requirement‟ there may be years when one 
could be at-risk-of-poverty.  
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pension requirements for 2005 and 2050 are presented in Table 7. These 
suggest for instance, that given the current anticipated length of retirement, 
men in Austria require net pension wealth of at least 5.1 times the average 
wage if they are to stay out of poverty, on average, throughout their retirement. 
Women tend to have a higher net pension requirement than men, as they live 
longer. At present, in some of these countries, they also have lower pension 
ages.  
 
Table 7: Net pension wealth requirement to remain out of risk-of-poverty 
(multiple of average wage) 
 
Men Women 
2005 2050 2005 2050 
Austria 5.1 7.2 6.5 7.2 
Finland 4.9 6.1 6.1 6.9 
France 6.5 7.6 7.7 8.5 
Germany 5.1 6.0 5.8 6.6 
Hungary 5.3 7.5 6.6 7.2 
Italy 5.3 7.4 6.3 7.2 
Poland 4.2 6.7 5.9 7.7 
Slovak Rep 5.3 7.1 6.2 7.0 
Sweden 5.3 6.2 6.1 6.9 
UK 5.0 7.0 5.3 5.7 
Average* 5.3 6.9 6.2 7.1 
Note: Net pension wealth requirement is the pension wealth required so that the average 
annual pension is enough to keep one above the risk-of-poverty (i.e. 60% of the median 
equivalised income).   
* Weighted average by population. 
Source: Own estimates using discount rate of 2% and Eurostat life expectancy projections. 
 
The benefit of having this benchmark is that it directly conveys information 
about the strength of the poverty alleviation function of the pension system. For 
instance, if we know that given the current life expectancy in Austria, to 
remain, on average, out of risk-of-poverty a man needs pension wealth 
equivalent to 5.1 times the average wage, this immediately suggests that 
current pension wealth of 8.1 is more than sufficient. By contrast knowing that 
the gross replacement rate for someone on the mean wage in Austria is 69% 
tells us little on the pension system‟s efficacy in reducing risk-of-poverty, 
especially since replacement rates are in terms of one‟s previous income and 
not the current poverty threshold.  
    
Given current life expectancy, the lowest net pension requirement is for Polish 
men, while the highest is for French women. However this need not remain the 
case in the future. The other benefit of having a net pension requirement 
benchmark is that it moves in line with changing conditions, such as increasing 
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life expectancy. If pension wealth stays the same, the net pension requirement 
benchmark helps us to realise that pensioners have to spread over a larger 
number of years the same transfers that their predecessors had. By contrast, a 
replacement rate at the point of retirement is not usually affected by a change in 
life expectancy.
57
 Since pensions lose their relative value over time, if life 
expectancy is higher, having the same replacement rate in the future could well 
imply a weaker poverty alleviation function of pensions.  
 
Similarly having a net pension requirement benchmark improves our 
evaluation of the impact of pension age changes. The latter tend to leave 
replacement rates unchanged while reducing pension wealth. Using 
replacement rates, one would conclude there was no change in generosity, and 
vice-versa if one uses pension wealth. However by reducing the period in 
retirement, pension age changes also limit the net pension requirement. For 
instance, at present Polish men, due to their low life expectancy, have a net 
pension requirement considerably lower than men in the UK – who face their 
same pension age of 65. By 2050, the situation will be reversed, even though 
Polish men will still have shorter life spans than UK men. However the latter 
will start receiving their pensions at 68, rather than at 65 like Polish men. Table 
7 shows that the net pension requirement for men is going to increase more 
than that for women. This reflects the fact that pension age equalisation will 
offset a lot of the anticipated increase in longevity for women.  
 
Table 8 presents net pension wealth estimates for 2050 for those in the bottom 
half of the wage distribution computed on the basis of EU Commission 
forecasts of labour participation rates and Eurostat life expectancy projections. 
These estimates suggest that despite cuts in pension generosity and increases in 
pension ages,
58
 net pension wealth should still rise slightly across the ten 
countries under review.
59
 The increase in pension entitlements is lower than the 
expected rise in the period in retirement. Pension wealth will need to be spread 
more thinly, so to speak, across a longer retirement period.  
 
  
                                              
57
  Unless the system has defined contribution elements, in which the annual benefit 
depends on the period over which the cumulative pension entitlements need to be 
spread. In this case, higher longevity lowers replacement rates. 
58
  In the absence of the pension reforms carried out since the mid-1990s, net pension 
wealth across these ten countries would have increased by about 47% for men and 
26% for women, which coupled with the increase in the pensioner cohort size would 
have resulted in very high fiscal burdens. 
59
  If instead of adjusting for actual careers, we had assumed full careers, we would 
report a projected increase in net pension wealth of 3% for men and a 5% drop for 
women. Improved labour participation should offset part of the impact of reduced 
pension system generosity. 
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Table 8: Net pension wealth estimates for those in the bottom half of the 
wage distribution (modelled to reflect their projected actual career) 
retiring in 2050 (multiple of average wage) compared to OMC indicator on 
replacement rates 
 
Men Women 
Net pension 
wealth 2050 
% Change 
on 2005 
Net pension 
wealth 2050 
% Change on 
2005 
Austria 8.1 -1 7.3 -11 
Finland 8.5 +61 8.2 +43 
France 5.7 -15 6.5 +18 
Germany 6.0 +16 6.4 +35 
Hungary 7.2 +17 7.0 -17 
Italy 7.1 -16 6.1 -28 
Poland 4.9 6 4.4 -28 
Slovak Rep 5.2 -37 4.8 -45 
Sweden 6.7 +8 6.5 +6 
UK 5.2 +36 5.3 +18 
Average* 6.0 +2 6.0 +1 
Note: Net pension wealth for actual-career case based on labour market participation by age 
and sex data. See Grech (2012) for details. The actual-career case reflects the pension 
entitlements for those earning a wage up to the 50
th
 percentile of the wage distribution. 
* Weighted average by population. 
Source: OECD (2011) and own estimates using same model used in OECD (2011).  
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Figure 4: Achievable poverty thresholds based on net pension wealth 
entitlements of men in the bottom half of the wage distribution  
 
Source: Own estimates using same model used in OECD (2011). Net pension requirement 
based on discount rate of 2% and Eurostat life expectancy projections. 
 
Figure 5: Achievable poverty thresholds based on net pension wealth 
entitlements of women in the bottom half of the wage distribution  
 
Source: Own estimates using same model used in OECD (2011). Net pension requirement 
based on discount rate of 2% and Eurostat life expectancy projections. 
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Figures 4 and 5 illustrate this development. At present pension entitlements 
across these ten EU countries translate in an achievable poverty threshold of 
67% for men and 52% for women in the bottom half of the wage distribution. 
By 2050, pension entitlements, if spread evenly through retirement, would 
enable the average man, previously in the bottom half of the wage distribution, 
to have an income equivalent to 60% of the contemporary median disposable 
income. For women, however, there would be a slight improvement, to 53%. 
The largest decline in achievable poverty thresholds is for low-income men in 
Slovakia, followed closely by low-income women in the same country. At 
present pension generosity in this country is at par with neighbouring Austria. 
Recent reforms have, however, tightened the link between benefits and 
contributions, and reduced the degree of progressiveness in the pension benefit 
formula. Moreover they introduced a mandatory private defined contribution 
pension
60
 to partially replace the state pension. Similar reforms were carried 
out in Poland, and the results are expected to be quite similar. The state 
pension, by itself, will no longer maintain low-income individuals, particularly 
women, out of relative poverty. By contrast in Germany, France and the UK 
pension reforms have tended to strengthen or maintain the poverty alleviation 
function, notably by improving the generosity of minimum pensions. Weak 
indexation and a long retirement period interact to push people into poverty in 
their old age, increasing the importance of having adequate minimum pensions 
in place.  These estimates also show that the tightening of links between 
contributions made and benefits received makes it more crucial to have active 
labour market policies, unless countries are ready to countenance an increase in 
pensioner poverty. Similarly countries need to have adequate crediting 
provisions, if they want to reduce gender income inequalities in old age.  
 
The EU Commission‟s pension adequacy indicator, i.e. the change in net 
replacement rates, similarly to the estimates of achievable poverty thresholds 
suggests a decline in generosity by 2050. However there are important 
differences, as can be seen from Table 9. Firstly, the proposed pension wealth 
indicators show that there should be a slight improvement of outcomes for 
women – a development which is not apparent when looking at the OMC 
indicator as the latter is gender neutral and cannot take into account increased 
entitlements due to higher labour participation. Secondly, the assumption of a 
full career appears to hide the full impact of reforms that penalise not having a 
full career, for instance the changes effected in Italy, Austria and Slovakia.
61
  
Thirdly, by focusing on those on average wages, the OMC indicator fails to 
give due importance to reforms that have increased system progressiveness, 
such as better minimum pensions, for instance in Germany, France and the UK. 
                                              
60
  Since the financial crisis, the existence of this second pillar has increasingly been put 
under question and recent administrations appear to want to backtrack on reforms.  
61
  In the case of Sweden, the fact that actual careers are close to the full-career 
assumption results in similar developments in the achievable poverty threshold and in 
the net replacement rate. 
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Finally, and most importantly, while the OMC indicator suggests a decline in 
pension generosity, it does not readily convey whether this is of concern. By 
focusing on theoretical generosity, the OMC indicator boosts the level of 
pension entitlements, particularly for women. It also fails to register the 
increased influence that weak indexation will have on the efficacy of pensions 
and does not capture the impact of changes to pension age.      
 
Table 9: Change in poverty threshold achievable in 2050 given net pension 
wealth estimates compared with OMC indicator on net replacement rates 
(percentage points) 
 Change in poverty 
threshold by 2050 
(men) 
Change in poverty 
threshold by 2050 
(women) 
Change in 
replacement rates by 
2050^ 
Austria -21 -8 +5  
Finland +2 +1 -8  
France -3 +16 -17  
Germany -2 +8 -3  
Hungary -4 -9 +5  
Italy -28 -17 +2  
Poland -16 -20 -17  
Slovak Rep -42 -32 -7  
Sweden -5 -3 -7  
UK +13 +17 +2  
Average* -7 +2 -5  
* Weighted average by population. 
^ Change in net replacement rates for full-career cases on average wage.  
Source: OECD (2011) and own estimates using same model used in OECD (2011). Net 
replacement rates from European Commission (2010), except for Hungary from European 
Commission (2009) as estimates in this paper do not cover the most recent reform in this 
country. 
 
Conclusion 
As yet, there does not seem to be a broad consensus in policymaking circles 
and academic literature on what constitutes the best measure of pension 
adequacy. The most popular indicator, however, appears to be the theoretical 
replacement rate estimated for a full-career male on average wages. 
 
While useful, particularly in static analysis, this measure is ill-suited for policy 
analysis especially when looking at increasingly common reforms like changes 
in pension ages or moves to make state pensions more defined contribution in 
nature. Theoretical replacement rates are hard to interpret as they do not have 
an underlying benchmark which allows their current or projected value to be 
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assessed as adequate or inadequate. Moreover they are a point-in-time measure 
which ignores the impact of benefit indexation rules and is unaffected by very 
important factors, such as changes in the pension age and in life expectancy 
after pension age. Moreover the emphasis on assumptions which are very 
unrepresentative of real-life labour market conditions also makes them 
deceptive, particularly in relation to current and future pension outcomes for 
women and those on low incomes. Theoretical replacement rates have little link 
with observed at-risk-of-poverty rates among the elderly. 
 
This paper has suggested an alternative approach based on estimates of pension 
wealth (i.e. the total projected flow of benefits through retirement) calculated 
using more realistic labour market assumptions. These estimates are then 
compared to a benchmark reflecting the pension entitlement required to keep 
an individual out of relative poverty through retirement. By focusing on total 
pension flows, this approach is able to take into account changes in the relative 
value of pensions over time. It also focuses analysis on the expected outcome, 
and lets the latter be affected by changes in longevity and pension ages. When 
applied to study reforms enacted since the 1990s in ten major European 
countries, the resulting estimates suggest that these reforms have decreased 
generosity significantly, but that the poverty alleviation function remains strong 
in those countries where minimum pensions were improved. Theoretical 
replacement rates indicate a decline in generosity, but fail to give a precise 
picture of who will be worst affected and the extent, if any, of resulting 
concerns. By contrast the pension wealth adequacy indicators clearly show that 
moves to link benefits to contributions have raised adequacy concerns for 
women and those on low incomes which policymakers, particularly those in 
Eastern European countries, should consider and tackle.  
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